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Abstract
In recent years, the impact of bots used for
manipulating public opinion has become an
increasingly prevalent topic in politics. Numerous
sources have reported about the presence of political
bots in social media sites such as Twitter. Compared to
other countries, the influence of bots in Finnish politics
has received little attention from media and
researchers. This study aims to investigate the
influence of bots on Finnish political Twitter, based on
a dataset consisting of the accounts following major
Finnish politicians before the Finnish parliamentary
election of 2019. To identify the bots, we extend the
existing models with the use of user-level metadata and
state-of-art classification models. The results support
our model as a suitable instrument for detecting
Twitter bots. We found that, albeit there is a huge
amount of bot accounts following major Finnish
politicians, it is unlikely resulting from foreign entities’
attempts to influence the Finnish parliamentary
election.

1. Introduction
Nowadays, many organizations and individuals
attempt to influence people by spreading propaganda in
social media through large networks of bot accounts [1,
2]. There are multiple examples of bots being used to
distort political discussions on Twitter. One of the most
notable cases is the 2016 US presidential election,
where an organization linked to the Russian
government has been accused of striving to manipulate
the elections by spreading fake news or biased content
via Twitter bot accounts [2, 3]. In this light, a number
of studies have delved into the detection of bot
accounts through developing and testing new bot
detection methods. Based on synthesizing key factors
for bot detection reported in previous studies, the study
developed an integrated framework for bot detection.
Specifically, this study aims to demonstrate how
bots that are being used to influence politics on Twitter
can be identified using machine learning approaches.
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To demonstrate the application of the method, we
identified the bots that existed before the Finnish
parliamentary election in April 2019 using user-level
metadata. Noticeably, recent publications have found
evidence of bots being used to influence opinions in
countries such as the United States [3], Japan [4],
Brazil [5] and Russia [6]. Similar studies have not been
conducted in Finland, albeit there is already evidence
of at least one large but inactive Finnish Twitter botnet
according to a researcher at F-Secure [7, 8]. In other
words, our study seeks to answer the following two
research questions, including:
RQ1: What are the important features that can be
used to identify bots?
RQ2: Do the bots have an impact on Finnish
politics?
To answer the research questions, we first develop
a model that can predict bots using machine learning
methods. Once the bots are identified, we assessed the
impact in terms of visibility and popularity of
politicians followed by these bots.
This paper contributes to the growing information
systems science and political data science literature on
the use of bots and information systems to influence
voters. The study also adds to bot detection literature
by evaluating the feasibility of using a limited set of
profile metadata features in a supervised machine
learning bot detection model. As a part of the research
project to detect bot’s effect on ongoing European
elections, we deem the study addresses a timely and
important topic, as there is evidence of attempts to use
bots to influence voters during recent European
elections [9, 10].

2. Related research
We analyze the related research in three parts. The
first part looks at how previous research has classified
bots and provides a clear definition of key terms and
concepts. The second part analyzes methods that have
been used to detect bots in Twitter-related research and
provides a background and benchmarks for the bot
detection model proposed. The third and last part
covers literature on the use of bots in political

Page 2430

influencing during recent years to support the findings
and assumptions made.

2.1. Terminology and the definition of a bot
A bot can be defined as an account that is operated
fully or partially by a program. Thus, at least some
parts of a bot account’s activities are automated.
Examples of these include bots belonging to like farms
that are used on social media to increase the number of
followers of an account or likes of a particular post.
However, they are prone to detection and thus,
deletion. More advanced bots adjust their content
dynamically based on the behavior of other accounts,
making them more difficult to detect even if the bot is
still operated solely by a program. The most
sophisticated bots are such that humans control parts of
their activities, such as content creation, which blurs
the line between the bot and a human user. When
properly operated, these hybrid bots are almost
invisible to automatic detection mechanisms, according
to Grimme et al. [11]. Some bot accounts are inactive,
also known as sleeper bots [12]. The accounts are
‘quiet’ most of the time before being activated e.g. to
spread spam.
On Twitter, bots can be divided into benign and
malicious bots [13]. The benign bots adhere to
Twitter’s rules and guidelines and are clearly
distinguishable from human accounts usually by name
or description. Conversely, malicious bots participate
in activities that are not permitted by Twitter and rarely
disclose the fact that they are operated by a program.
Typical use cases include artificially boosting the
number of followers, likes or retweets and directing or
blurring discussions as well as spreading spam or
content that supports a certain cause. Both types
include bots ranging from simple content sharing
accounts to human-like social bots that participate in
discussions and create original content. The phrase of
social bot here refers to a bot that is meant to mimic
human behavior [12] by communicating and
interacting with human users [14].
An important subtype of Twitter bots is political
bots, which are specifically designed to participate in
political discourse or to promote a certain ideology,
organization, or individual [12]. In most cases, a
political bot will have no references to it being a bot
but may attempt to mimic human behavior in order to
avoid detection and to influence other users.

2.2. Detecting bots on Twitter
2.2.1. Simple versus complex models. As algorithms
that control bots become more advanced, so do the bot
detection algorithms. In literature, bot detection models

range from the very simple ones that are based on
analyzing one piece of metadata to those that use
ensemble methods to analyze large feature sets
including a mix of metadata, tweeting behavior, and
content data.
Past studies on bot detection have been to some
extent restricted to bots with a specific feature. For
instance, Beskow and Carley [15] managed to identify
specific automatically generated bot accounts based on
a single piece of metadata, the profile name, with
approximately 95%-99% accuracy depending on the
algorithm used. However, this type of approach results
in a very narrow use and the aforementioned model
could only detect bot accounts that have an account
name consisting of a randomly generated string of 15
characters and more than likely to miss out the bots
with different characteristics. However, as Beskow and
Carley [15] propose, a tool-box approach where
multiple different models are combined can make even
the simple models an important contribution to more
advanced bot detection models.
A number of bot detection models looked into
various characteristics of accounts by combining
metadata and behavior features to identify bots (e.g.
[16, 17]). One notable issue hinders the reusability of
these models. Many of these models rely on some form
of natural language processing, sentiment analysis
techniques [14] or a specific list of keywords [6, 16,
18]. This restricts their applicability to a particular
language and region as well as an event such as an
election, due to certain themes and hashtags being
important only in that specific context. Bots have been
evolving rapidly during the past few years to a point
that they may be difficult even for a human to
distinguish them from real users [19]. There is a need
to update bot detection algorithms, since a workable
algorithm today may prove to be ineffective after a
couple of years.
2.2.2. Feature space selection. Machine learning
methods represents the key approach used in early bot
detection literature, in which an essential aspect of
work is to determine the optimal feature space that
boost bot prediction performances. There are two main
considerations in the selection of bot detection
features. Firstly, the features should be added only if
they improve the accuracy of bot detection. Secondly,
the features must not make the data collection phase
overly time-consuming, since Twitter’s API has strict
rate limits.
In previous studies, the most common classes of
features used in bot detection include metadata-based
features and tweeting characteristics-based features [6,
8, 18]. User profile provides a large amount of
metadata while tweets offer useful information, albeit
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being limited to a certain number of characters (280).
Based on these features, the amount of analyses that
can be performed is vast. Other classes of features,
such as keywords, are not included in the analysis,
because these features restricted the applicability of the
model to a specific event.
Metadata-based features can be divided into two
different branches. Intuitively, metadata extracted from
a profile gives information on the account, while
metadata from tweets gives a combination of
information from the profile posting it as well as the
tweet itself [20].
Metadata that can be extracted from Twitter include
basic profile information such as name, description,
and number of friends. An examination on whether
different pieces of profile information are blank or at
default contributes to a collection of binary features,
such as a variable of whether or not the profile picture
has been added [6, 16]. The more fields are left at
default, the more likely the account is a bot [6]. Data
on the number of users that the profile is following, the
number of followers and ratios of these are also often
used in prior bot detection studies [6, 8, 18, 20].
Profiles that have none or a few followers, but follow
many profiles are suspect [8]. Lastly, the contents of

the textual metadata can be analyzed and used to
classify bots for instance by inspecting the length or
frequency of certain keywords in the description or
name [8, 15, 18].
Earlier findings suggest that a combination of both
metadata and content features yields optimal results [3,
18]. Hundreds of different features can be derived from
Twitter’s metadata and content data, making it a matter
of preference on which ones to choose. Examples
include counting the number of hashtags, URLs, and
instances of specified keywords in the name or
description of an account.
The model proposed in this study utilizes metadatabased features only and therefore, they are examined
more thoroughly than content-based and other types of
features. Further, unlike tweet content-based features,
metadata-based features are more generalizable across
different linguistic context. Table 1 illustrates some of
the features that have been used in previous papers [6,
17, 18]. Unsurprisingly, the most common features are
the ones that are directly related to how Twitter
functions, default profile values, with the number of
followers, friends, tweets, and retweets being examples
of these.

Table 1. Summary of key features for bot detection used in prior literature
Binary features
Defaults:
- Profile image
- Background image
- No user description
Other:
- Profile verified
- Location specified
- No friends
- No tweets

Profile information
features
General:
- Number of followers
- Number of friends
- Number of tweets
- Number of likes
- Age of account
- Account language

Ratio features
Activity:
- Ratio of following and
followers (FE/FI)
- Reputation (FE/(FI + FE))
- Given likes per friend
- Given likes per follower

Length:
- Profile name
- Profile description

In Table 1, the features are grouped into four types.
Some of the most commonly used features are found in
the first group as binary features. Based on the
popularity, it can be assumed that they are appropriate
for bot accounts detection despite their simplicity.
Binary features are designed to check whether profile
customization options, such as the profile image and
background image, are left at default [6, 17, 18].
The second group also contains many of the
prevalent features in bot detection models. These
features are often numerical variables, many of which
are related to how popular a Twitter account is and
how actively it is used. Particularly, the numbers of
followers, friends, tweets, retweets, and likes were
often investigated [6, 17, 18]. Another commonly used
feature is the length of the description text, which

Account age:
-Friends/Account age
- Following rate (FI/AU)

Metadata content
features
Bot check:
- Name contains bot
- Description contains bot
Other content:
- Number of # in description
- Keywords in description
- URL(s) in description

cannot be obtained directly from Twitter but can be
calculated easily from the metadata [6, 17, 20].
The third group of features is ratios that can be
obtained from the same metadata. When compared to
the two previous groups, the ratio features offer more
variety as they are not based on Twitter’s built-in
attributes. Followers-to-friends ratio is a common ratio
feature used in many previous studies [6, 18, 20]. In
the model created by Fernquist et al. [18], the top
features for bot detection include multiple of ratios,
with examples being given likes per friend, followersfriends ratio, and number of likes per followers.
The last group consists of the features deriving
from the contents of different attributes. Features in
this group are occasionally used in earlier studies. Two
of the features in this list simply check whether an
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account is a bot according to the profile description or
name by looking if the fields contain the word “bot”
[15]. The rest of the features relate to an examination
of URLs, hashtags ,or other keywords [20].
Because ratio features were among the best
performing features widely used in early studies [6, 18,
20], we include several of them in the study alike.
2.2.3. Classification methods. Because Twitter, like
most of the social media sites, actively attempts to
detect and disable bot accounts, the creators of bots
have responded by making bots behave more like
humans. Consequently, the selection of features as well
as preparing the training data has become more
demanding and for a model to stay up to date, feature
engineering and adding new training datasets is needed
[20].
Both supervised [6, 15] and unsupervised [16, 21]
machine learning models have been used in bot
detection research. The drawback of supervised
learning is that creating a labeled dataset for training
the model either requires a large amount of manual
labeling [6] or using a pre-labeled dataset, which may
limit the applicability of the model as the datasets most
likely represent only a fraction of the possible behavior
of bot accounts in Twitter. Unsupervised learning
models can detect novel bot behavior that may get past
a supervised model [16], as the supervised models can
only detect bots that are similar enough to the dataset
that was used to train it. However, the results of
unsupervised models are more difficult to validate due
to the absence of labeled data.
Past studies indicated that supervised models are
better suited for analyzing topical datasets that are
collected from Twitter’s streaming API [6]. Twitter’s
API allows performing searches and collecting the data
on tweets that contain for certain keywords or
hashtags, which is particularly useful when analyzing
political discourse that is related to a specific topic,
such as an election [18, 22]. Since campaigns, political
parties, candidates and users use hashtags to make their
tweets visible when commenting on specific topics, it
is more efficient to mine data on a topical level with
the keyword search instead of first collecting a large
dataset of Twitter accounts and then analyzing the
content of their tweets.

bots supports. [23] noted that “it is an effective nonmilitary means for achieving political and strategic
goals.” Measuring the successfulness of political bots
is difficult as it is hard to quantify the impact that they
have had for example, on voting behavior [23].
Nevertheless, the prevalence of computational
propaganda campaigns would suggest that they are
viewed as a functional tool that does have an effect on
the target audience [23].
More measurable and easily achievable targets
include manipulating the popularity and visibility of
tweets by liking, following, and retweeting content
with a botnet. These methods can cause a particular
hashtag to trend thus, pushing it higher into the feeds
of other Twitter users. Other goals may be to make an
opinion seem more popular than it actually is or to
bury actual discussions or factual information by
making it difficult to follow. Concrete examples
include spamming pro-government tweets or flooding
search results related to protests with meaningless
content making it more difficult for human users to
find and participate in discussions [24].
Two earlier studies monitored bot activity in
Germany during a state parliament as well as Federal
presidential election [10] and federal election during
2017 [9]. Bots represented around 7 - 11% of the
accounts and bot-driven content represented 7.4 - 9%
of all traffic during the German elections [9, 18]. These
are modest numbers and in line with Twitter’s estimate
of bots accounting for approximately 10% of Twitter
activities. The main reason for concern is that the bot
activity was skewed towards supporting the alt-right
movement and was possibly produced by accounts
outside of Germany [9]. As an extreme example, in
Russia, Stukal et al, [6] reported that up to 85% of the
daily tweets containing political keywords were posted
by bot accounts during 2014-2015. Obviously, there
are regional differences in the prevalence of bot
accounts [12].
Finland, the focus of this research, may also be
affected by bot account, considering i) the current
growth of Euroscepticism, ii) rise of right-wing
political movements alongside Finland’s historical
relations and iii) proximity to Russia that may provide
a more fertile foundation for bot activity than for
example Sweden.

2.3. Use of bots in political influencing

3. Methodology

Previous studies illustrated that Twitter-based
computational propaganda has been used by
organizations and governments across the world [12].
There are several hypothesized goals of the creators of
bots. These range from increasing the partisanship of a
population or advancing a cause that the creator of the

This study employed an unorthodox approach to
collect Twitter data as the dataset is compiled from
individual accounts’ followers, which differs from the
more traditional methods by collecting all tweets (and
associated account metadata) that use specific hashtags
or keywords are gathered through Twitter’s Streaming

Page 2433

API. This method is appropriate since the proposed bot
detection model only requires metadata. The benefits
of this approach include that it allows detecting both
dormant bots as well as those that do not use specific
hashtags or words that the streaming method queries
for.
The primary tools used in data collection and
formatting phase were the statistical programming
language R and its “rtweet” package, which is an “R
client for accessing Twitter’s REST and stream APIs”.
The study analyzed the Twitter accounts of several
politicians and their followers on Twitter. The profiles
were selected based on several heuristically chosen

criteria to ensure that as many political parties as
possible were represented and that a sufficient amount
of data was collected. At least a member of parliament
was taken from each of the current coalition parties as
well as from all parties that have support of over 5%,
albeit a maximum of two per party. Furthermore, only
accounts with over five thousand followers were
picked. Lastly, some prominent politicians with over
10 thousand followers were selected even if they do
not match the other criteria as several influential
political figures would otherwise be excluded. Table 2
shows the selected politicians.

Table 2. Summary of selected politicians
Name
Alexander Stubb
Sauli Niinistö
Juha Sipilä
Anne Berner
Pekka Haavisto
Ville Niinistö
Paavo Arhinmäki
Li Andersson
Antti Rinne
Sanna Marin
Jussi Halla-aho
Laura Huhtasaari
Sampo Terho
Paavo Väyrynen

Political party
National Coalition Party
National Coalition Party
Centre Party
Centre Party
Green League
Green League
Left Alliance
Left Alliance
Social Democratic Party
Social Democratic Party
Finns Party
Finns Party
Blue Reform
Seven Star Movement

Username
@alexstubb
@niinisto
@juhasipila
@AnneBerner
@Haavisto
@VilleNiinisto
@paavoarhinmaki
@liandersson
@AnttiRinnepj
@MarinSanna
@Halla_aho
@LauraHuhtasaari
@SampoTerho
@kokokansanpaavo

Followers (K)*
370
159
126
21.7
130
84.3
109
76.5
25.6
14.3
14.5
13.7
7.6
10

*Number of followers at March 2019

The sample consists of 14 politicians from 8
different parties ranging from liberal to conservative
and left-wing to right-wing, including the current
president and three ministers as well as 6 party
leaders. Many small parties were left out by this
approach, of which respective politicians did not
have accounts or had much fewer followers. As a
result, over 1.1 million Twitter accounts were
collected as followers of these politicians, but the
number was reduced to approximately 550,000 after
filtering out duplicate accounts. The duplicates were
a result of the fact that many Twitter users were
following multiple selected politicians.
The binary features were calculated from
corresponding attributes where a setting left at default
or blank equals 1 and a nondefault 0. The ratio
features were created similarly by calculating the
values from the profile information metadata and
then placed into new columns. Ratio calculations that
resulted in NaN (not a number) or Inf (infinite), were
replaced with a zero.

3.1. Creating training data
Based on the findings of previous research and

datasets available for training the model, a selection
of 11 features was picked for testing the first version
of the model. The feature space consists of four
binary features, four profile information features, and
three ratio features.
Initially, the model was trained with the cresci2017 dataset [25], which contains over 13,000
labeled accounts divided into groups of social
spambots, traditional spambots, fake followers, and
genuine accounts. The training dataset was balanced
to include 3,000 randomly sampled bot accounts and
3,000 randomly sampled genuine accounts from the
cresci-2017 dataset.
To find a suitable algorithm for the prediction, the
Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), Classification
and Regression Tree (CART), K-nearest neighbors
(KNN), Support-vector machine (SVM) and Random
Forest algorithms were tested. Out of these Random
Forest performed the best, although there were signs
of either the training data not representing the variety
of real data or that the model being overfitted as the
accuracy was over 97% or 98% on most runs. This
issue was ignored, as the model was deemed
sufficiently accurate for the first phase where the goal
was mainly to speed up the training data creation by
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manually validating list of potential bot accounts
from the prediction results. The model was then
tested on a sample of 5,000 accounts from the dataset
that was collected for this study.
After manually inspecting on Twitter the accounts
that the model labeled as bots, it was evident that the
model had difficulties distinguishing bots and
genuine accounts. Particularly, accounts that were
apparently created by people trying out Twitter
without becoming active users were prone to be
labeled as bots due to the similarity in the account
behavior. In most cases, the easily distinguishable
bots were following approximately 20-100 accounts,
had 0-2 followers and little to no tweets, retweets or
likes.
Based on the performance of the first version of
the model, it was apparent that the cresci-2017
dataset was unsuitable for training a model that could
accurately distinguish bots from humans based on
metadata. One possible explanation for such
performance is the fact that the training data used in
the model had only very clear examples of bots and
genuine accounts, where the behavior in terms of
tweets, retweets, likes and ratios of followers and
following differed widely depending on whether the
account was a bot or not. However, this does not
reflect the actual behavior of accounts where in some
cases even with quantitative and qualitative
assessment it is difficult to label an account
accurately as either a bot or a human.
By manually labeling a set of accounts from the
dataset consisting of followers of the Finnish
politicians, a new training dataset that represents the
actual distribution and behavior of the accounts of the
target dataset was created. The training data was
created by checking and verifying the accuracy of
2,000 accounts predicted to be bots by the first
model. The results were that out of these accounts
1,336 were accurately labeled as bots, as they were
either bots or accounts exhibiting extremely bot-like
behavior while 664 were actually humans or accounts
that were impossible to determine as belonging to
either group.
A qualitative approach was employed for
classifying the accounts as either bots or humans. The
classification started by inspecting the profile
information of the account. Common signs of a bot
were the name or description of the account, which
often included Russian or Arabic and or a seemingly
random string of characters and numbers coupled
with the account following 21 other Twitter users,
which is the default number of recommended users to
follow given by Twitter when creating a new
account. Other possible predictors included in this
step are the profile image and banner as well as the

age of the account. As a second step, the tweets and
retweets were checked when available to see what
kind of activity the account has and what other
accounts it interacts with. As the third step, the
accounts that the possible bot was following were
inspected to find discrepancies. For example, a user
following mainly seemingly random foreign accounts
coupled with one Finnish politician or if it was
following exactly 21 very popular Finnish accounts
were usually the best predictors of an accurate
classification as a bot even though the machine
learning model did not look for these. If after the
three first steps the account was still too ambiguous
for classification, the likes and followers were
checked for bot-like behavior.
During this process, several interesting findings
were made, which can be used later in the analysis of
the whole dataset. Firstly, most of the bot accounts
were dormant as well as possibly a part of a follower
boosting operation. Secondly, most of the bots were
difficult to label as political bots as it is not sure
whether they were created to boost the followers of a
particular politician or if it followed them by
coincidence based on Twitter’s recommendations.
Commonly, shared characteristics among bots
included that they barely engaged with content or
interacted with other users and that they followed a
random group of 21 accounts, which most likely are
those suggested by Twitter during the creation of the
account [7, 8]. Peculiar accounts that they often
followed included less well-known US politicians, an
obscure game called Growtopia and a niche Finnish
newspaper called Markkinointi and Mainonta.

3.2. Building the bot prediction model
The second version of the bot detection model
differed from the previous one mainly in how the
splitting of the training and validation data was done,
what parameters and algorithms were used as well as
how many features were included.
New features could be added to the second
version of the model as the training data was no
longer a limiting factor. By including the age of the
account, and two ratio features derived from
comparing the profile information to the age of the
account, the number of features was increased from
11 to 14.
Several variants of the Random Forest algorithm
were tested, but the standard version still performed
optimally and was selected for the final model. The
model was trained with a randomly sampled set of
500 bots and 500 humans from the new manually
labeled dataset. The remaining 1000, with 836 bots
and 164 humans, were used in the validation of the
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performance. The final version of the bot detection
model has an accuracy of 83% with only slight
changes after multiple runs and small variations in
parameter settings. Table 3 lists the most important
statistics for assessing the performance.
Table 3: Performance of the bot detection model
Metric
Accuracy
Recall
Specificity

Value
0.837
0.846
0.793

Table 4: Features ranked
Rank
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Feature
Following
Following to age of account
Age of account
Followers to following
Likes to following
Tweets
Likes to age of account
Followers
Default profile image
Likes
No description
No location
No banner
Likes to followers

Importance
100.00
61.00
56.57
22.87
15.68
15.18
11.95
10.05
7.11
6.34
4.72
3.61
2.56
0.00

In terms of feature importance, the top features
were a mix of profile information and ratio features,
while the binary features were all in the bottom half
of the feature ranking. Table 4 contains the full
ranking of the features. Based on this, the model
gives much weight to the number of accounts that an
account is following, since the two top features are
related to the following attribute. This is somewhat
problematic for our overall goal of political bot
detection as it implies that the model is best at
detecting dormant bots and bots belonging to
follower farms. These accounts can be political bots,
but in many cases determining if they are following
politicians on purpose or by coincidence is difficult.
This is because the popular politicians often appear
on the top of the recommended accounts to follow in
Finland.

4. Findings and discussion

on metadata is that the data collection is much
quicker as 90,000 accounts’ information can be
retrieved every 15 minutes. Therefore, a model that
uses metadata works particularly well when studying
countries that have a small population, since then
even the most popular Twitter users are likely to have
a manageable number of followers. In other words,
due to the limited number of users in these countries,
it is possible to gather comprehensive datasets for
analysis in short periods. Furthermore, analyzing
entire populations instead of samples is feasible with
a purely metadata-based model, contrary to models
that use tweet data, where the number of accounts to
analyze is restricted by Twitter’s streaming API’s
rate limits.
Regarding the selection of the feature space and
algorithm, most of the results were in line with the
reviewed literature, although some of the results were
surprising. Random forest was the optimal
classification algorithm, which was the result in
several other models as well [18]. While ratio
features had high feature importance as suggested by
previous research, the binary features did not despite
their popularity in earlier models. Overall, the
performance of the model was below most of those
listed in the literature review, but as stated earlier
direct comparison is difficult due to the differences in
the goals of the models.

4.2. Bots Counts in Finnish political Twitter
Based on our bot detection model, we predicted the
total number of bots in the dataset consisting of the
558,983 followers of the 14 Finnish politicians was
formatted to match the training dataset. The model
predicted that out of the dataset approximately 36.6%
are bots. Since the model’s accuracy is 83%, out of
the 204,426 accounts classified as bots it can be
assumed that 169,673 should be the real number of
bots when not taking into consideration the accounts
labeled as humans that in reality, are bots. Therefore,
the percentage of bots in reality is likely to be closer
to 30% based on the results and the accuracy of the
model.

4.3. Influence of Bots in Finnish political
Twitter

4.1. The proposed bot detection model
The bot detection model proposed in this study
demonstrated that metadata alone is sufficient for
classifying at least spambots and bots that belong to
follower farms. The primary benefit of a model based

Overall, the findings of the study do not support
the notion that Finland and Finnish politics would be
the target of internal or external bot influencing
campaign, due to most of the bots having almost no
activity besides following popular accounts. This
finding is line with a recent announcement made by
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Supo, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service,
which stated that it has not found evidence of foreign
entities attempting to influence the elections [26].
Despite few political bots, over 150,000 bot
accounts following Finnish politicians on Twitter
were identified. Although these bot accounts do not
interact much with other accounts, they still help the
politicians that they follow by two ways. Firstly, they
artificially inflate the number of followers a politician
has making them possibly more popular than they
actually are. Secondly, they help increase the
visibility of politicians, since being followed by
many promotes an account over other less popular
accounts in Twitter’s “who to follow” suggestions.
Consequently, bot accounts that were created for an
entirely different purpose may unintentionally follow
politicians when they follow their accounts based on
Twitter’s recommendations.
The primary impact that the bots have on Finnish
political Twitter is related to increase the visibility
and perceived popularity of the politicians’ accounts.
Considering a low utilization of Twitter as a medium
for political debate in Finland, the possible effects the
bots that may have had on voters may be negligible.
Nevertheless, one metric for measuring a politician’s
popularity that can be used to predict election results
is how many followers they have on different
platforms and how much their audience engages with
them [27]. Therefore, even if the impact on actual
voting behavior is minimal, the presence of bots may
manipulate perceptions, influence predictions and
damage the validity of social media engagement as
an indicator of actual popularity.
When inspecting the scores of individual
politicians, Pekka Haavisto and Alexander Stubb had
the highest percentages of bot followers, with both at
above 30%, which is beyond Twitter’s own estimates
of 5-10% accounts being bots. The strong bot
presence in Haavisto’s Twitter follower base was
subject to debate already in 2017 during his
presidential election campaign [28]. Previous
analysis attributed the bot followers to a result of a
sudden increase in bots promoting the game
Growtopia and Twitter’s recommendations boosting
Haavisto, which is similar to the findings of this
study.
Alexander Stubb, the other notable example of a
politician benefitting from the added visibility, has
acquired the largest absolute number of bot
followers. Many of the bots did not follow any other
politicians besides Stubb, which is likely due to his
strong presence in Twitter as the 3rd most followed
account in Finland.
Contrary to findings elsewhere [4, 9], the
candidates most likely to be linked to the Finnish alt-

right movement Laura Huhtasaari and Jussi Hallaaho had the lowest percentage of bot followers.
However, this is not surprising when taking into
consideration that they also have the lowest number
of followers from the sample of accounts inspected,
which means that they do not attract bots that follow
accounts by default based on Twitter’s
recommendations.

5. Conclusions
The goals of this study were to develop a new
supervised machine learning bot detection model to
investigate if Twitter bots were used to influence the
2019 Finnish parliamentary election and to test a new
approach for Twitter bot detection. The developed
model was used to estimate the number of bot
followers that a sample of the most popular Finnish
politicians have in their follower base.
The dataset used in the study consisted of 550,000
unique accounts out of which roughly 169,600 were
classified as bots. The metadata-based model was
found to be feasible for classifying bots on Twitter
and the predictions of the model were used to assess
if bots were utilized during the 2019 Finnish
parliamentary election. The findings imply no
evidence of attempts to influence the elections via
Twitter bots. Although the bots increased the
visibility of some politicians and made them seem
more popular, the bots are unlikely to have had much
effect due to their passive behavior.
This study holds important implications for both
the researchers as well as practitioners. Our study
explores a number of primary meta data-based
features as well as ratio-based profile features to
predict bots in Twitter. This approach provides better
coverage of the profile characteristics, and it is
generalizable to a wide variety of context due to the
linguistics independence.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the
first in studying the presence and influence of bots in
a Finnish context. Our results imply that the bots are
surfacing in the Finnish domain. Even though we did
not find the bots to have a significant impact, we
cannot predict how this could change in the future.
These results should be of interest not only to
researchers, but also to politicians and users of social
media in Finland.
Lastly, our results also highlight the influence that
Twitter’s suggestions can have on the number of
followers that popular accounts have. These results
indicate that profiles followed by bots are likely to
attract more bots, further inflating their number of
followers and perceived popularity.
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5.1. Limitations
Like all studies, our study also has limitations.
First, the approach used in the selection of politicians
and data collection phase as well as the choice of
features in the machine learning model introduced
some constraints to the analyses that could be
performed. Our sampling approach ignores the user
accounts that do not follow politician yet remain
politically active. Although it was possible to
determine if an account is a bot based on metadata,
the collected data did not enable examining the
content that they interacted with or spread via tweets,
retweets, and likes. However, it is worth noting that
most of the bots detected are not actively creating or
distributing content. Lastly, politicians with much
higher or lower percentages of bot followers may
have been omitted from the sample.

5.2. Suggestions for further research
To further understand the use of bots in the
Twittersphere, the model could be reused during
future elections by collecting new datasets. This
would be particularly interesting due to the Finnish
Security Intelligence Service’s suggestion that the
EU elections are likely to be a more attractive target
for external influencing attempts than the Finnish
parliamentary election [26].
To analyze the efficiency of Twitter’s own bot
detection and removal practices, the rate at which
accounts labeled as bots are removed from the social
media site can be followed. In addition, changes in
the activity of the bots can be monitored by
inspecting how the attributes such as a number of
tweets and likes changes over time. Especially
interesting would be to find evidence if some of the
accounts were sleeper bots waiting for activation.
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